Managing U.s.-soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention by Alexander L. George

Author:Alexander L. George [George, Alexander L.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780367019761
Google: mYtbxgEACAAJ
Goodreads: 50927481
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Group
Published: 2019-06-07T11:05:57+00:00

The July Decision for Military Assistance To FNLA and UNITA

In the spring of 1975 it became evident to Washington that the Soviets had stepped up military supplies to the MPLA and that this support had enabled the MPLA to turn back the challenge from the FNLA and to mount effective counteroffensives in May and June. The FNLA was evicted from Luanda, and the transitional government collapsed. Under pressure from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) the three Angolan liberation movements renewed in June their earlier agreement to form a coalition government, but this accord proved short-lived, and Angola was plunged once again into civil conflict.

Under strong pressure from Zaire and Zambia to give more support to the FNLA and also to initiate assistance to UNITA, Washington undertook a review of the Angolan situation and considered its options. As early as May 1 the new assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Nathaniel Davis, in a memo to Kissinger, cautioned against initiating aid to UNITA leader Savimbi, warning that U.S. assistance could not long be kept secret and expressing concern over a possible link between Savimbi and South Africa. Davis also expressed concern that the United States could soon find itself drawn deeper into the internal conflict. An interagency National Security Council task force on Angola submitted a report on June 13 that strongly opposed military intervention and came out in favor of an attempt to achieve a peaceful solution through diplomatic and political measures. The task force also recommended that the Soviet Union be approached through diplomatic channels and urged support for a U.N. or OAU mediation effort. Such a diplomatic option, the task force report argued, would reduce the likelihood that Soviet arms would determine the outcome and avoid the danger of a superpower confrontation. The report argued against sending covert military supplies into Angola because such an action, it warned, would commit U.S. prestige in a situation whose outcome was in doubt and risk public exposure of U.S. involvement with highly adverse domestic political consequences. In a later memorandum of July 12 Davis continued to argue against covert intervention on the grounds that it would be ineffectual and would lead to further escalation; he called attention to the fact that the CIA itself had noted that the Soviets could escalate the level of military aid more readily than could the United States and, hence, that unless Washington was prepared to go as far as necessary, it stood to lose out in Angola.40 This was a clear and explicit warning that in the competition with the Soviets in Angola the United States lacked escalation dominance and would find it difficult to establish favorable ground rules.

Despite the task force's strong recommendations, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger in the end decided to provide $30 million in military assistance to the FN L A and UNITA. It is important to take note of the domestic political context in which this decision was made, for it may well have strongly reinforced

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